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Abstract 
DNA analysis for family reunification is a longstanding and widespread practice, but 
also a highly problematic one, as it is a battleground of conflicting values and 
interests, which have to be carefully weighed against each other: on the one hand, the 
right of the sovereign state to regulate immigration and prevent fraud and child 
trafficking; on the other hand, the right to privacy and family life. Beyond the 
problem of how to balance these different interests, DNA analysis for family 
reunification brings up the broader problem of biologisation/geneticisation of social 
relations, as this practice appears to reduce family to its mere biological notion. As 
there is no comprehensive account of the ethical implications of DNA analysis in the 
context of family reunification, the present paper will try to fill this gap by addressing 
the three most striking ethical problems posed by this issue: the privacy issues at 
stake; the problems concerning the conceptual, legal and social definition of family; 
and the question whether this practice intends to produce the immigrant as 
discriminated “bare life” (Agamben) or must rather be seen as a symptom of an 
ongoing general biologisation/geneticisation of sociality, also influencing family 
reunification procedures.  
Introduction: Tales of hope and despair 
As early as 1985, when DNA fingerprinting and genetic analysis were still highly 
contested techniques in forensic practice, Nature carried a report entitled ‘Positive 
identification of an immigration test-case using human DNA fingerprints’.2 The 
authors describe a case in which a Ghanaian boy who was born in the UK but went to 
Ghana on a visit was denied return to the UK – where his mother and siblings lived – 
on the grounds of suspected substitution of the boy with a nephew or a totally 
unrelated child. The family’s lawyer asked for a DNA analysis to establish the 
parentage of the boy. The test demonstrated that the woman was in fact “the true 
mother”3, so the immigration agency dropped the case and the boy was permitted to 
return to the UK and to be reunited with his family. 
 
But there are Ghanaian DNA analysis tales with less happy endings. In 2007, the New 
York Times published the story of Issac Owasu, a widower and naturalised US citizen 
of Ghanaian origin who also resorted to DNA analysis to accelerate his reunion with 
his four sons still living in Africa. “But modern day science often unearths secrets 
long buried. When the DNA results landed on Issacs Owusus's dinner table […], they 
showed that only one of the four boys […] was his biological child. […] The State 
Department let his oldest son, now 23, come to the United States […], but said the 
others – a 19-year-old and 17-year-old-twins – could not come because they are not 
biologically related to him.”4 
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The strange molecule DNA, said to contain the essence of the human being,5 was 
from a very early stage focused on the DNA of the stranger, the immigrant, the 
asylum-seeker, eager to prove his or her genetic-biological ties in order to be eligible 
for immigration. 
 
The term ‘family reunification’ refers to the right of family members living abroad to 
join relatives who hold long-term residence permits in a given country. While this 
right has previously been an integral part of many countries’ immigration policies, the 
current trend among host countries seems to favour more restrictive family 
reunification policies. Many countries are imposing stricter requirements on those 
applying to enter the country, requiring them to provide official documentation to 
prove their identities (birth and marriage certificates, passports, etc.). Providing such 
information is often difficult, especially for those travelling from countries that do not 
use official documents to establish identity, or where the documents have been lost or 
destroyed due to politically unstable situations. But even if applicants do possess the 
required documents, the information is sometimes rejected by immigration authorities 
who question the authenticity of the documents. In this context, many countries resort 
to DNA analysis to resolve cases in which they consider the information presented 
concerning family relations to be incomplete or unsatisfactory.6 
 
Although the exact number of cases in which DNA evidence is used for immigration 
purposes is not disclosed by the governmental agencies in most countries, available 
evidence indicates that the use of genetic testing within the context of immigration is 
on the increase. At least 17 countries have incorporated the use of DNA testing into 
decision-making on immigration: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the USA.  
 
In the UK, according to one report, in the 10 years after the first use of a DNA test in 
a family reunification case in 1985, “DNA fingerprinting was used to test more than 
18,000 immigrants who had been refused entry into the UK. Of these, more than 95 
per cent produced results that showed they were blood relatives of UK citizens and 
were therefore entitled to British citizenship.”7  
 
Despite its relatively long history, increasing use and highly problematic aspects, there 
is still very little academic research on this topic, especially concerning the ethical 
implications underlying the practice of DNA analysis for family reunification. The 
studies published so far treat the issue mostly from a legal point of view or with a 
focus on specific national contexts.8  
 
Drawing on first results from the interdisciplinary and multinational project DNA and 
Immigration9 and focusing on the German situation where the longstanding practice 
of DNA analysis for family reunification has only recently been regulated (by the 
Gendiagnostikgesetz (Act of Genetic Diagnostics) enacted in February 2010), I will 
attempt to focus on so far underexplored aspects, especially privacy issues. I will also 
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look at the changes in the notion of family which, as a result of advances in 
biotechnology, seems somehow trapped between geneticisation and de-biologisation.  
Privacy and genetic privacy 
The birth of privacy from the spirit of liberalism 
“The scholarly literature prescribing ideal definitions of privacy is extensive and 
inconclusive.”10 Although Anita Allen is probably right, we cannot forego the notion 
of “privacy”, which is one of the most important concepts not only in contemporary 
ethics but also in legal codes, and is a central ethical issue for the use of DNA analysis 
for family reunification. 
  
The 12th Article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: “No one shall 
be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right 
to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”11 This emphasis on 
privacy as a fundamental principle for society is a relatively modern concept. For 
some of the earliest political thinkers, such as Plato and Aristotle, the human being 
was primarily a political animal. However, Aristotle was realistic enough to see that 
politics, or the polis, understood as the open space of uncoerced discussion between 
free and equal individuals, has a material basis: the oikos, i.e., the house or family.  
According to Hannah Arendt, in the ancient world the private sphere, the oikos, had 
the function of guaranteeing the survival of the individual and the species. The oikos 
merely provides the basis for biological life, which is subordinated to the necessity of 
meeting natural needs. The fact that the oikos is simply the realm of natural animal 
life is reflected in the internal structure of the household, where the authoritarian pater 
familias exercises absolute power. In contrast, in the realm of the polis freedom and 
autonomy can be realised, 
 
Aristotle himself stressed that in the realm of the oikos the lord is not free either, but 
like everyone else is bound by the necessity of survival. In the private sphere of the 
oikos, the human being is still an animal and not yet a political animal; that is, not yet 
fully human, if to be human means to be free and to make responsible choices. In the 
words of Hannah Arendt:  
 
According to Greek thought, the human capacity for political 
organisation is not only different from but stands in direct opposition 
to the natural association whose centre is the home (oikia) and the 
family. The rise of the city-state meant that man received 'beside his 
private life a sort of second life, his bios politikos. Now every citizen 
belongs to different orders of existence; there is sharp distinction in 
his life between what is his own (idion) and what is communal 
(koinon)'. It was not just an opinion or theory of Aristotle but a 
simple historical fact that the foundation of the polis was preceded 
by the destruction of all organised units resting on kinship [...].12 
 
Whereas, according to Arendt, for the ancient Greeks freedom was essentially 
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exercised in the public sphere (polis), for modern liberalism – the political ideology 
on which Western liberal democracies are based – the genuine place of freedom is 
private life (oikos). Public or state interference in this sphere can be justified only 
when absolutely necessary to preserve the freedom of the individual person.13  
 
But if humanity consists in exercising the ability freely to choose what the human 
being considers to be the best for him/herself, this choosing must take place 
undisturbed by the outside (and inner) world. Freedom necessitates isolation from 
inner (emotions, effects, physical needs) and outside interference. Thomas M. Cooley 
consequently asked for a “right to be let alone”.14 In their essay ‘The Right to 
Privacy’, which might be said to mark the starting point of the discussion on privacy, 
Brandeis and Warren state, with reference to Cooley: “The intensity and complexity 
of life, attendant upon advancing civilisation, have rendered necessary some retreat 
from the world, and man, under the refining influence of culture, has become more 
sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more essential to the 
individual.”15 
 
Of special interest in the context of DNA analysis for family reunification is the fact 
that in decisions of the Supreme Court of the USA, US family life was from a very 
early stage included in the notion of privacy.16 This is, incidentally, in line with liberal 
theory which sees privacy in concentric circles around the individual person, so that 
home and family are situated near the centre of individual privacy, i.e., the core value 
of liberalism.  
 
Although different concepts of privacy have been under attack from different sides17 – 
ranging from the rather eccentric efforts to dissolve it into a myriad of particular 
interests,18 through attempts to reduce privacy to liberty,19 and finally the feminist 
critique, which sees privacy as a subtle disguise to cover up private violence20 – the 
right to privacy is an established and widely acknowledged moral right, although 
explanations of what exactly privacy means are still under discussion. Whereas 
authors like Edward J. Bloustein, located in the classical liberal tradition, identify 
privacy with human dignity21, Charles Fried22 and W. A. Parent23 agree in their 
definition of privacy as control over personal information, i.e., as the right of the 
individual to decide which information about herself may be made available to others 
and under what circumstances, but they differ in the rationale that they give for the 
importance of privacy.  
Genetic privacy in a non-medical context 
Genetic exeptionalism 
In the context of privacy, at least since the start of the Human Genome Project, 
genetic privacy has received special attention and a demand has been made for a 
genetic exceptionalism, stating that genetic data merits special protection. The special 
danger for personal privacy deriving from the access to one's genetic information 
arises from the exceptional nature of this information which concerns the biological 
conditions of personal existence. Genetic material contains information not only about 
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one's physical phenotype and (allegedly) behavioural traits (or at least the probability 
of their expression), but also information about the likelihood that a person (and her 
kin) will develop specific diseases. The possibilities of a misuse of this data are 
extensive, ranging from the denial of private medical insurance to disadvantages on 
the labour market.  
 
Anita L. Allen distinguishes “informational, decisional, physical, and proprietary 
dimensions”24 of genetic privacy. According to Allen, genetic privacy is normally 
associated with informational privacy in the sense of “the claim of an individual to 
determine what information about himself or herself should be known to others”25 
based on the notion of individual autonomy or self-determination.  
 
The genetic privacy concerns heard today range far beyond 
informational privacy to concerns about physical, decisional, and 
proprietary privacy. Briefly issues of physical privacy underlie 
concerns about genetic testing, screening, or treatment without 
voluntary and informed consent. In the absence of consent, these 
practices constitute unwanted physical contact, compromising 
interests in bodily integrity and security. Decisional privacy concerns 
are heard in calls for autonomous decision making by individuals, 
couples, or families who use genetic services. A degree of choice 
with regard to genetic counseling, testing, and abortion are a 
requirement of respect for decisional privacy. The fourth category of 
privacy concerns proprietary privacy, encompasses issues relating to 
the appropriation of individuals' possessory and economic interest in 
their genes and other putative bodily repositories of personality.26 
 
The notion of genetic exceptionalism has been challenged on the grounds of the 
difficulty of conceiving genetic information independently from other medical 
information,27 as well as with reference to the paradigmatic skip from genetic 
determinism to genetic probabilism, which sees genetic information not as an 
imminent destiny, but as a manageable risk or even chance.28 But risk is no less 
frightening than destiny, as the discussion about the right not to know genetic 
predispositions has shown. Although the notion of genetic determinism has been 
abandoned, knowing one's risk is no less troubling than having a certainty, as the 
knowledge of predispositions to illnesses or hereditary diseases may have a deep 
impact on the psyche and the way in which one conducts one's life. The supporters of 
a right not to know base their opinion on the argument that the individual should have 
the choice to live her life unencumbered by the knowledge of having a greater risk (or 
even certainty, as in the case of Huntington's Disease) of developing a disease later in 
life. The individual should decide by herself whether or not she wants to know about 
her risk of suffering from a particular condition.29 
 
In fact, in the age of generalised genetic tests, mere probabilities have become less 
and less distinguishable from facts.30 As Nikolas Rose has shown, nowadays genetic 
predispositions to certain illnesses produce the same consequences as the illness itself, 
so that there is no longer a distinction between “pre-symptomatic patients” and actual 
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patients, blurring the Aristotelian distinction between potentiality and reality. The 
mere predisposition to a certain illness, where the person “feels” completely healthy 
and doesn't show any symptoms, may lead to the same consequences that the outbreak 
of the illness would. This is best illustrated by the “treatment” of pre-symptomatic 
breast-cancer patients: two-thirds of the women diagnosed as having the mutated 
allele in their genome, which “raises their risk of developing breast cancer sometime 
in their lives to between 60 and 90 per cent”31, decide to undergo preventive surgery.  
Excess data in a non-medical context  
Moreover, DNA fingerprinting may produce excess data – meaning data about 
predispositions and probabilities of gene expression – the collection of which may not 
be explicitly intended but nevertheless occurs. Given the unforeseeable evolution of 
genetics, it is not possible to say what information may be revealed through specific 
DNA data in the future, so the claim that DNA fingerprinting can be used only for 
identification and does not disclose anything else about a person is merely 
speculative, as the discovery of the unexpected important function of ‘junk DNA’, 
which for a long time was thought to contain no information at all, has shown.32 We 
simply do not know what information a given genetic data set may reveal in the 
future. In addition, Amade M’charek has drawn attention to the fact that there are 
tendencies in (forensic) DNA fingerprinting to substitute non-coding DNA with 
coding DNA to infer the possible phenotypic appearance of suspects.33 In this regard, 
genetic exceptionalism still seems to be justified.  
 
Special attention has been given to the importance of privacy in the context of 
medical intervention. The storage of genetic material or genetic information here is 
allowed only with informed consent, fundamental in the medical context. This consent 
normally has to be given in writing and serves to ensure that the person concerned is 
informed about the amount, nature and scope of the collection and processing of her 
data. The forms on which the informed consent is recorded have to specify that the 
consent is voluntary and can be retracted at any time, and what (legal) consequences a 
refusal to give consent may imply.  
 
Informed consent given under coercion is invalid.34 Furthermore, the large body of 
literature on informed consent in the medical sphere stresses that the way in which the 
patient is advised in order for them to be able to give a truly informed consent should 
not assume an ideal, reasonable person, but must take into account the specific 
situation of the actual person whose consent is desired. Thus, it is ethically not 
sufficient to provide the related information about the meaning and possible 
consequences and alternatives in a way that an average person (or even worse, an 
average physician) would understand, but in such a way that the person involved is 
able to understand to what she is consenting. It is probable that this sort of ethically 
sound information on the meaning, the possible alternatives and the consequences of a 
DNA analysis to assert a genetic relationship may be especially difficult in the context 
of family reunification cases where the concerned persons come from different 
cultural backgrounds and may often have very little previous knowledge on genetics.  
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In the context of DNA analysis for family reunification, extremely sensitive data may 
be collected, handled and stored not in a medical context, where it will be regulated 
by strict ethical frameworks and professional ethics to prevent misuse, but in an 
administrative context where such standards are not always met. A telling example for 
the problems posed by the handling of genetic data outside the medical context is the 
legal regulation of DNA analysis for family reunification in Germany by the 
Gendiagnostikgesetz (Act of Genetic Diagnostics). The focus of this law is on the 
right of informational self-determination, with the aim of protecting individuals from 
the abuse of their genetic information. However, some important legal guarantees do 
not apply for the use of genetic data gathered in the context of family reunification. 
For example, immigrants can neither demand that their genetic data and samples be 
destroyed, nor prevent the possibility of their data or samples being used for criminal 
prosecution purposes.  
 
In a statement delivered in a hearing at the German Bundestag the German charity Pro 
Asyl, an organisation devoted to assisting asylum seekers, criticised the law, It said 
that the law, originally designed to protect nationals against misuse of their genetic 
data or samples in the medical context, in fact strips immigrants of this very 
protection by explicitly denying applicants for family reunification those rights. When 
it comes to DNA analysis for family reunification the Act explicitly denies the 
applicants the right to retract their consent, the right to have their data and samples 
destroyed, the right not to have their data used for secondary purposes (mainly 
forensics), and the right to be informed or, conversely, the right not to know, about the 
possible health risks (including the possible psychological shock of learning that 
alleged relatives are not biologically related).35 The double standard thus created in 
the treatment of personal data and genetic samples of immigrants and residents can 
hardly be justified by the legitimate interest of the state in preventing illegal 
immigration, including human trafficking.  
Genetic privacy and children’s rights 
An especially delicate area is the treatment of children. In the bioethical literature on 
informed consent and children there is broad consensus that as far as possible even 
very young children must be included in decision-making processes regarding 
medical intervention, and that the actual psychological and physical development of 
the children involved must be taken into account. Even small children may be 
involved in the decision-making process if they are able to understand what it is 
about. It is reasonable to assume that this consensus also extends to decision-making 
processes regarding the genetic information of children. In the case of DNA analysis 
for family reunification, it is not possible to bypass the need for informed consent of 
the children by resorting to the consent of the parents, on the simple logical grounds 
that before the test the alleged parents cannot be considered the legal parents of the 
child – the entire aim of the DNA analysis is to establish that they are biologically the 
parents of the child. In order to perform DNA analysis on immigrant children the state 
has – at least on a conceptual level – first to claim custody of the child and then 
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consent that the state performs the DNA analysis on its foster child. Although this 
procedure involves different government agencies, it remains problematic that the 
state acts both as legal guardian and immigration authority.  
 
As mentioned above the concept of privacy – centered around the singular individual 
– from a very early stage of its discussion included the family, which is widely 
identified with the private and secure space necessary for the free development of the 
individual. This liberal idea of an intrinsic connection between individual freedom 
and family led to the formulation of the human right to family life and consequently to 
the right to family reunification nowadays often achievable only through DNA 
analysis. But what notion of family underlies this praxis and more generally, what 
does it mean to be a family in an age in which family relations seem to be 
demonstrable through genetic analysis?    
Family concepts 
Dual standards in the definition of family 
Several studies have demonstrated that the core family is a contingent notion in both 
diachronic and synchronic terms.36 But even accepting the plurality of family 
definitions in time and among different cultures, one could still argue that immigrants, 
whatever the definition of family in their culture of origin, should accept the 
definition of family held by the society that they want to, or have to, live in. Put 
bluntly: if an immigrant or refugee wants to, or has to, live in a Western democracy, 
she will have to adapt to the laws and customs of that society, including its definition 
of family. But the adoption of the common definition of family in Western liberal 
societies is exactly what is denied to immigrants applying for family reunification in 
most countries, as the majority of Western liberal societies share a pluralistic and 
mostly socially defined notion of family, including patchwork families, adopted 
children, and same sex families, yet this definition is denied to immigrants who have 
to resort to DNA analysis to apply for family reunification. Even in countries where 
the right to family reunification encompasses more than the core family, the 
possibility to reunite with family members not linked by consanguinity remains 
largely hypothetical, as the necessary documentation to prove kinship is often rejected 
as insufficient by the immigration authorities. Germany, for instance, does not 
generally accept any documents on family status from 40 countries.37 Thus despite 
other provisions DNA analysis often represents the only possible route to family 
reunification. 
 
The practice of DNA analysis for family reunification implies that only biological 
relatives are eligible for family reunification and excludes all family members who 
are related socially. This requirement of a biological link between family members is 
diametrically opposed to family recognition policies in many host countries, which 
emphasise social rather than genetic ties.38 This results in the ethical problem that a 
“dual standard of family recognition” is established for native citizens and 
immigrants.39 This focus on genetic links also means that alternative forms of family 
are devalued and seen as secondary; they are not recognised as “true” family ties.  
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The family between de-biologisation and re-biologisation 
The use of DNA analysis for family reunifications, then, fails to take into 
consideration not only the different definitions of family of the immigrant/refugee 
culture, but also the definition of family generally pertaining in liberal democracies, 
which has undergone a dramatic transformation in recent times:  
 
Parenthood was understood to be largely a natural relation founded 
upon biological reproduction, and a legal status as a parent followed 
easily from recognition of that natural fact […]. Recently, however, 
the changes sweeping over the rest of family law have caught up to 
parenthood as well. Biology is increasingly called upon to share its 
privileged status as the foundation stone of parenthood caregiving 
and other social values. Legal parenthood without genetic 
connection, marriage, or adoption is now a reality in several U.S. 
States. Proposals to expand the numerical boundaries of parenthood, 
so that a child might have at once three, four, or even more parents, 
now carry the imprimatur of the United States' most influential law-
reform organisation [The American Law Institute].40  
 
So although Western societies are embracing more and more liberal definitions of 
family, abandoning the biological concept of family, their immigration policies 
contradict this general tendency because, although the legal frameworks may allow 
for the possibility to reunite with family members who are not biologically related, the 
strict guidelines regulating which documents are accepted as proof, transform DNA 
analysis for family reunification – originally intended as a last resort – into the 
standard procedure.41  
  
On the one hand, this biologisation of the family strengthens its traditional social 
function (procreation) and structure, as (married) partners can prove that they are 
“truly” related only through their biological offspring, which become the “material 
proof of their conjugal love”, a notion echoing and performatively naturalising42 the 
traditional (Christian) definition of marriage. The implicit preconception of family is 
that of the nuclear family composed of two heterosexual parents and their biological 
children, a model which even in Europe was established only in the 18th century and is 
losing more and more ground in a period when patchwork families and homosexual 
partnerships are widely accepted.43 By reducing the immigrant family to biological 
ties, the practice of genetic testing for family reunification promotes the 
hetoronormativity of the nuclear family.44 Furthermore, the return of the distinction 
between legitimate and illegitimate children, implicit in the current practice of 
immigrant family reunifications, is at the very least anachronistic, and is arguably in 
contrast to the views of the general public in Western societies. In an attempt to 
mitigate this anachronistic effect, in France the law does “not test paternity in order to 
avoid embarrassing revelations about fidelity in past relationships”,45 but only the 
biological kinship between mother and child.  
 
On the other hand, the geneticisation of family resulting from the practice of DNA 
analysis for family reunification could be seen as part of a relatively new tendency 
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towards a general biologisation of human relations also visible in the emergence of 
consumer genomics46 and forms of “biological citizenship”47 or “genetic 
citizenship”.48  
De-biologisation through biology? 
It is important to emphasise that this geneticisation of the family does not stem from 
genetics: it is precisely genetic and reproductive technologies that undermine the idea 
of parenthood as a natural relationship founded on biological relations, since they 
make it possible to distinguish systematically between biological parents and those 
who rear and educate a child, thus highlighting the limitation of the mere biological 
concept of parenthood, also reflected by the law and judiciary in the USA:  
 
In the realm of assisted reproduction […] the law for several decades 
now has permitted the conferral of legal parenthood without 
adoption and without any true pretense of a biological connection. 
Since the Uniform Parentage Act of 1973, the law in most 
jurisdictions has provided that a child born to a married woman, as a 
consequence of artificial insemination from a donor other than her 
husband, is legally the husband's child […] The sperm donor is dealt 
out of the picture entirely, even though he is known to be the genetic 
father of the child.49 
 
The basis for granting parentage here is not biology but the intentions of the people 
involved, so that it is not the surrogate mother, sperm or egg donor (the biological 
parent) who is considered to be the “true” parent, but the persons who demonstrate 
their “procreative intentions” and intend to raise the child, independently of whether 
this person is biologically related to the child. What is decisive is the “procreative 
intent” and not biological or genetic relatedness.50 The weakening of the biological 
notion of parenthood is also visible in the US states that permit some form of same-
sex marriage, as there the partners “can avail themselves of a presumption of 
parentage based on the traditional marital presumption, though without of course any 
supposition that it reflects an inference of biological parenthood.”51  
 
In 2000, the American Law Institute recommended the recognition of parents by 
estoppel and of de facto parents. “The revised Uniform Parentage Act therefore 
acknowledges the importance of a social-parental relationship that is more important 
than the genetic relationship in the best interest of a child over two years old.”52 
The new possibilities of assisted procreation are, paradoxically, strengthening the 
social conception of family and parenthood. In the context of assisted procreation, 
neither the sperm donor (the genetic father), nor the egg cell donor (the genetic 
mother), nor (in cases of surrogate motherhood) the childbearing woman is considered 
to be the legal parent of the child, but only the social parents, on the grounds of their 
manifest intention to take care of the artificially conceived child.  
Re-biologisation through culture? 
Although these developments at first glance seem to weaken the biological notion of 
family, biology or at least the imitation of biology still plays an important role in the 
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attribution of non-biological parenthood. In the USA, according to Meyer: 
 
The law often reflected an assumption that adoptive parents were 
second-best 'stand-ins' in circumstances where the 'real' – i.e., 
biological – parents were simply unavailable. At one time, it was 
customary for judges and caseworkers to place great importance on 
'matching' a child to prospect adoptive parents who shared the same 
ethnic, religious, and cultural background. Considerable effort was 
expended to ensure that the child physically resembled the adoptive 
parents, so that outsiders (or even the child) would not suspect that 
the family had been created by adoption Although adoptive parents 
were accorded full parental status … traditional adoption law and 
practice nevertheless implied that the legitimacy of the adoptive 
relationship turned in some sense on its ability to mimic a biological 
one.53  
 
The same is true for egg cell donation, where prospective parents and clinics are 
preoccupied with securing the greatest resemblance between the donor and the 
prospective mother.54 
 
Thus, one has to acknowledge opposing trends: on the one hand an ongoing 
weakening of the biological notion of family (due at least in part to newest 
developments in reproductive technologies), and on the other hand a growing 
tendency to link parenthood to biological ties, evident in other legal developments. So 
the possibility of a disestablishment of paternity on the grounds of a lack of biological 
relatedness is possible even after several years of effective social fatherhood.55 
Furthermore, “Courts have held men liable for support arrangements accruing during 
years when they were entirely ignorant of the children's existence – that is, when they 
were not legal parents at all.”56  
 
A creeping re-biologisation of parenthood is reflected by the growing number of US 
states allow the genetic father to establish legal “parentage of a child born of a 
married woman, even over the objections of the mother's husband. The readiness of 
these jurisdictions to reassign parental status on receipt of a DNA match, even when 
that means extinguishing a substantial pre-existing parent-child bond, reveals a 
reflexive commitment to biology as the essential foundation of parenthood.”57 
 
Another example of increasing biologisation is the abandonment of secrecy in donor 
insemination in most countries in recent times.58  
 
But where does this renewed interest in biological origin come from? Why the shift 
from anonymity to openness? “At a broader socio-cultural level, identity itself has 
been redefined. With the democratisation of genomic knowledge through the print and 
electronic media, particularly the internet, genes have become central to 'real' or 
legitimate identity and important determinants of health and behavior.”59 
Independently of the medical or psychological importance attributed to knowledge 
about one's genetic ancestors, the desire to know one's biological origins is a 
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preeminent current cultural phenomenon. As “social fact” genetic origin is very real 
and has very real consequences at the level of social relations. For example, a 
paternity testing study carried out in Australia “revealed that most men who found out 
they were not the biological father believed that their changed paternal status removed 
their right to be the father. Although legislatively they could assert this right, they 
believed that, being scientifically proven not to be the biological father of a child they 
had raised, they no longer could or should claim paternal rights.”60 
 
Although one anticipated result of the Human Genome Project, to discover particular 
genes for specific phenotypic features – an idea based on the one-gene-one-protein-
hypothesis – was not achieved, popular culture and society continue to cling to 
genetic determinism and have barely taken notice of the ongoing epigenetic shift in 
genetics. This shift has lead to a redefinition of the gene, which is now no longer 
conceived as the master molecule containing the program for the expression of 
specific proteins, but as a complex feedback system involving the entire cell (genes 
and cell plasma) and its environment. 
 
The relationship between culture and society on the one hand and biotechnology and 
genetics on the other is more complicated than it seems at first glance. The newest 
developments in biotechnology, mainly in reproductive technology, have led to a 
weakening of the biological notion of family, while a lack of genetic knowledge 
seems to be the reason for a strengthening of biologism in popular culture and society, 
leading for instance to “a rapid re-conceptualisation of paternity secrets from being 
protective of children and families to being 'a harmful subterfuge likely to damage a 
child emotionally and psychologically'.”61 Whereas the application of biotechnology, 
particularly reproductive technologies, seems to lead to a weakening of the biological 
notion of family, the lack of biological knowledge seems to lead to the re-
biologisation of parenthood.  
 
Re-biologisation is not limited to popular culture, but has also infiltrated academic 
institutions such as the German National Ethics Committee. In a highly controversial 
decision, the Committee, (established as a counselling body for the German 
parliament and administration) advocated the closure of facilities for the anonymous 
relinquishing of newborns. The Committee’s judgment was based not only on 
empirical studies suggesting that such facilities do not prevent infanticides, but also 
on an alleged fundamental human right to know one's biological/genetic origin: “A 
child has a right to his physical and psychological integrity. Since ignorance of one's 
parentage can be severely prejudicial to the development of a person's identity and 
give rise to profound psychological disturbances, this fundamental right of the child 
must be included in the considerations of the relevant merits.”62  
 
What the recommendation fails to consider is that in most cases these children have 
caring parents whom they know very well, even though these are not their biological 
parents. Whereas an earlier rationale was based on the assumption that it is in the best 
interest of the child (mainly to save her from psychological distress) not to reveal that 
she was adopted or the result of artificial procreation technologies, be it donor 
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insemination, ovum donation, surrogate motherhood or a combination of these 
techniques, in the age of genetic truth to know one's biological origin has become an 
unquestionable imperative, as it is conceived as the feature defining personal identity 
and autonomy.  
 
But if knowing one's genetic origin is truly so essential for psychological health and 
personal identity, as the German Ethics Committee and a growing sector of German 
public opinion seem to maintain63, and given the fact that according to new studies at 
least 2-4 per cent of fathers in Western countries are (mostly without knowing it) not 
the biological father of “their” children,64 why then not be consequent and advocate a 
general screening of all newborns and their alleged parents to determine if they are 
really the “true” parents? This simple thought experiment not only shows the 
untenable nature of the committee's position, but also that the practice of DNA 
analysis for family reunification establishes a dual standard in family recognition. 
Most of us would probably vehemently reject a generalised screening of all newborns 
to verify their kinship with their parents; but it is exactly this that is done with 
immigrants.  
 
What is entirely denied in this duty to genetic truth is the right not to know. This may 
be connected to the general tendency towards the imperative of self-governance and 
self-management reflected in the concept of “biological citizenship”. 
Biological citizenship as subjectivation between empowerment and domination 
DNA analysis for family reunification as domination 
The shift from paternalism to autonomy in biomedicine has not been limited to 
personal autonomy, but has lead to a new form of citizenship: “biological citizenship”, 
a term indicating the group-defining role of biological properties. Groups of persons 
base their identity on particular medical conditions or specific biological/genetic 
features, often in connection with claims for special rights or benefits. These 
“biosocialities”65 are organised in often powerful support and patient groups engaged 
in fundraising and lobbying to promote specific research agendas and promising 
treatments, and represent a new form of active “patients” facing the biomedical 
establishment as equal partners. Used in this sense, the term “biological citizenship” 
dates back to Adriana Petryna's study Life Exposed. Biological Citizens after 
Chernobyl,66 in which she examined the emergence of a new form of citizenship 
based on the health problems caused by radioactive contamination. According to 
Petryna, this biological identity also played a crucial role in the rise of an independent 
Ukrainian nation after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The important differences 
from modern biological group identity, according to authors such as Petryna, Nikolas 
Rose and Carlos Novas, lie in the empowering aspect of these new identities. In the 
past, alleged biological features – i.e. the products of naturalisations and performative 
discourses67 – were intended to stigmatise minorities and used to promulgate eugenic 
policies aiming to combat an alleged “degeneration” of the population by enhancing 
the biological fitness of the nation. The new biological group identity emphasises the 
responsibility of the individual subject and “pre-symptomatic” “pre-patient”68 to 
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manage his health and risky biology in his own interest. “What we have here, then, is 
not eugenics but is shaped by forms of self-government imposed by the obligations of 
choice …”69 
 
However, in the context of genetic testing for family reunification, the notion of 
biological citizenship reveals an unexpected new aspect. In the existing literature, the 
idea of biological citizenship often stresses the democratic, anti-authoritarian and 
counter-hegemonic potential of this concept. But genetic testing for family 
reunification more closely resembles the old-fashioned practice of “subjectivation”, 
meaning not self-governance but domination, as here it is the sovereign power that 
reduces the immigrant family to its animalitas, linking legal claims to biological facts. 
In this process alleged biological features such as race or ethnicity are implicitly 
attributed to the foreign “subject”, because the genetic linkage between individuals 
always also connotes ideas of biological race, since DNA analysis for family 
reunification presupposes the concept of genetically different sub-populations. The 
authority here is held by an absolute sovereign power which is able to exercise 
domination. The decision to allow or refuse immigration in family reunification cases 
often comes close to the sovereign power over life and death, as family life is intrinsic 
to “good life” and is an undeniable human right whose denial harms human dignity.  
 
From an Agambenian point of view, the use of DNA analysis in family reunification 
cases can be interpreted as highlighting the sovereign power hidden under the facade 
of liberal democracies. From this perspective, the practice of DNA analysis for family 
reunification resembles not a form of empowering biological citizenship but more 
“Biopolitics” in the sense Agamben uses this term, as here the “bare life” of the 
immigrant is actually produced by the political. In contrast to Foucault, for whom the 
inclusion of mere biological life in the realm of politics is the “threshold of 
modernity”, according to Agamben politics was always Biopolitics, as for Agemben 
politics is characterised by the, somehow Hobbesean, dialectics of sovereign power 
over life and death and the potentially killable life of the “subject”.  
 
According to Agamben, and in contrast to the work of Arendt mentioned above, 
politics since its very beginning was based on the reciprocal constitution of absolute 
sovereign power and subjected citizens. Again in accordance with Hobbes, citizens 
are constituted as such in the very moment they become subjected to the sovereign 
power, which is the very same event through which sovereign power becomes what it 
is. This means that the killable life of the “subject”, i.e. the citizen, what Agamben 
calls “bare life”, is, as well as sovereign power, the product of politics and may not be 
confused with the mere biological life that Agamben terms “zoe”. In fact “bare life” as 
a necessary element of the political sphere – without which there would be no 
sovereignty and therefore no political order at all – is nothing “natural”.  
 
Agamben distinguishes between (a) zoe, the mere biological substratum of the human 
life, (b) the specific human life-form, i.e. the form of life including thinking, speaking 
and sociality (bios), and (c) “bare life”, i.e. the potentially killable life-form of the 
citizen. The confusion between zoe (conceptually antecedent to the political 
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distinction between life-forms), and “bare life” as the killable life-form produced by 
politics, is due to the fact that the production of “bare life” in politics is performed by 
reducing the human life-form to mere biological life now defined as killable life. The 
wrong identification of zoe with “bare life” is provoked by the fact that the production 
of killable life-forms is regularly achieved by reducing human life-forms to mere zoe. 
But the “bare life” produced by the reduction of the human bios to mere biological life 
is not the same as simple biological life. The result of the reduction of the human 
animal to its animality is not the same as the animality which forms the biological 
basis of humanity. Thus “bare life” is not mere biological life, i.e. the biological 
substratum of humanity (zoe) but the result of the reduction of the human life-form 
(bios) to zoe. The mere life that forms the basis of the human animal (zoe) gifted with 
reason is not the same mere life that remains after the reduction of the rational animal 
to its animality (“bare life”). The first one is neither worth living nor killable, the 
latter is the killable product of politics.  
DNA analysis for family reunification as empowerment 
Admittedly, there is another possible reading of DNA analysis in the context of family 
reunification, relating it to self-empowering “biological citizenship”, as the use of 
DNA testing for family reunification can be seen as an empowering tool in the hands 
of prospective immigrants who in the past would have had no chance at all to migrate. 
From the point of view of the immigrants, the use of DNA analysis in family 
reunification procedures is ambiguous. It could be seen as discriminating and 
criminalising – as we have seen in the German example where the law permits genetic 
data and samples of immigrants to be stored for forensic purposes “when criminal acts 
are suspected”,70 but not that of nationals. However, it is possible to see it as 
empowering, as it not only enables people to apply for family reunification which 
they were previously generally denied, because of the difficulties of proving family 
ties by documentation in certain countries, but may also accelerate and simplify the 
entire immigration process. In a way similar to the ambiguous role that genetic 
knowledge and biotechnological achievements have played in the field of 
reproductive technologies for the (de)-biologisation of the family, the role of 
biotechnology is also ambivalent in the context of DNA analysis for family 
reunification. 
 
From a Roseian point of view, one could interpret the advent of the new technology of 
DNA analysis, which replaces the older techniques of marriage documentation 
analysis and extended interviews with the alleged family members, as empowering. 
Applicants may actively prove their relationship by themselves and no longer need to 
be dependent on the good will of a civil servant who has to be persuaded that one is 
telling the truth. From this perspective, the use of DNA analysis for family 
reunification and the connected “biologisation” of the applicants can be seen as 
producing a form of empowering “biological citizenship”.  
New truth machines 
It is important to emphasise, however, that the change in the techniques employed to 
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decide family reunification cases implies a radical shift in the way that truth is 
produced, as with the new technique the body becomes a kind of biological lie 
detector. Whereas the conventional techniques (documentation analysis and 
interviews) finally lead to a decision by a human subject (an official or judge) over the 
truthfulness of another subject, and could therefore be right or wrong, the new 
technology (DNA analysis) does not produce judgements about subjects but 
declarations about statistical probabilities, which by definition can be neither true nor 
false. So to draw on the alleged facts of genetics paradoxically leads to an 
abandonment of facts. In the truth regime of DNA analysis, a positive genetic test 
does not establish whether the alleged family members are actually related, as the 
results of such a test are never ‘true’ but only ‘probable’. What is observable in the 
differences between these two truth regimes is the difference between our everyday 
“life world”71 (Husserl) and the abstraction of scientific facts. 
 
This difference leads to the greater question of what meaning information about 
genetic predisposition – that is the probability that one will contract a certain illness 
by a certain age – can have for us. What does it mean for a 40-year-old person to have 
a 60 per cent increased probability of developing heart failure by the age of 80? What 
do we do with this kind of information? Although this question deserves a much 
deeper analysis, beyond the scope of this paper, we hope that this paper gives an idea 
of the principal uncertainties produced by the introduction of DNA analysis in the 
context of family reunification, because in order to provide information about 
probable genetic relationships (with “negligible” error margins) it is necessary to 
abandon “truth”.  
 
Beyond these epistemological differences between the old techniques of document 
analysis and interviews on the one hand and DNA analysis on the other, it has to be 
emphasised that from an ethical standpoint the older techniques are probably no less 
problematic than DNA tests, because their potential to harm personal privacy is 
equally enormous, especially when intensive interrogation techniques are used on 
children. Interviews are not automatically the ethically less challenging technique, as 
Murdock seems to suggest.72 
 
Although it may be less expensive to interview children than to carry out DNA tests, 
as Murdock claims (a dubious claim, incidentally, given the ever-decreasing costs of 
DNA analysis), interrogations of children cannot be advocated. Interviews of this kind 
put the children under immense psychological pressure and may lead to worse harm 
than DNA analysis. An unexpected DNA test result (“true” or “false”) may certainly 
severely harm family relations, but a negative decision by the immigration service 
based on the (maybe misinterpreted) interrogation of a child, resulting in the denial of 
family reunification, creates an intolerable burden on the child, who bears 
responsibility for the rest of his life for the separation of his parents. A false, i.e., 
misinterpreted, interview with a child is therefore ethically much more problematic 
than a false DNA analysis. In my view ,interviews with small children should under 
no circumstances be part of family reunification procedures.   
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Conclusions 
DNA analysis for family reunification raises highly contested and widely discussed 
ethical and political issues, ranging from definitions of family and privacy to fair 
immigration practices and geneticisation. As we have tried to show, the use of DNA 
analysis for family reunification, and especially the way in which this technique is 
implemented, not only reflects ongoing transformations in our societies but also 
reveals how we conceive politics, family, and ourselves. The way in which we treat 
immigrants and asylum seekers can tell us a great deal about the society we are living 
in, about who we are and where we are going.  
 
Our reflection upon the privacy issues posed by the use of DNA analysis for family 
reunification – especially those related to the handling of genetic data and samples in 
a non-medical environment and the unique problems posed by the involvement of 
children – has led us to considerations about the dual standards adopted by liberal 
democracies when it comes to defining immigrant families and domestic families. 
Whereas a resident family may assume diverse forms (patchwork families, same sex 
partnerships etc), an immigrant family is – by practice, if not as defined by law – 
reduced to a mere biological relation, as proving family ties is often possible only by 
genetic analysis.  
 
This prompted us to examine the role biology plays in the current interpretation of the 
family within our liberal societies. The analysis of conflicting tendencies within the 
legal and ethical discourse about the role of biology in defining family ties allowed us 
to formulate the hypothesis that the current situation represents a contemporaneity of 
two conflicting tendencies: on the one side what seems to be a growing tendency to 
re-biologise the family, seen particularly in popular culture and the media, and on the 
other side a contrasting tendency to de-biologise the family on the grounds of 
scientific insights.  
 
Finally we explored the not less conflicting possible interpretations of DNA analysis 
for family reunification in the context of ongoing debates about biopolitics, mainly the 
question whether this practice represents a form of discrimination and biopolitical 
“subjectivation”, producing the immigrant as “bare life” subjected to the sovereign 
power, or if DNA analysis could be interpreted as a form of empowerment of the 
applicant based on an explicit reference to his biology, which would transform DNA 
analysis for family reunification into a technique to achieve “biological citizenship”.  
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